At the height of his power, Robert Byrd (a 9-term senator) allocated huge sums to his home-state of West Virginia. Anecdotes abound regarding the generations of West Virginians who lived completely through this government funding.
Perhaps these anecdotes even understated the magnitude of government spending in West Virginia, as government spending had grown to 56.6% of state GDP in 2010. States and families are not the only entities that specialize in the procurement and continuation of flows of dollars from the government. We show in this paper that firms also engage in this activity, to the detriment of their long-term value. In particular, there are firms in the economy whose existence is nearly entirely dependent on winning, and keeping, government sales. We find that these firms, which we dub "government dependents," exhibit a number of distinct characteristics, and behave differently on a forward-looking basis after becoming government dependents, relative to otherwise identical firms.
We exploit a statutory reporting standard that requires firms to make publicly available information regarding customer-supplier links in their financial statements. Specifically, Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report the identity of customers representing more than 10% of the total sales in interim financial reports issued to shareholders.
Using this data from financial statements, we find a surprisingly large number of firms with dependence-links to the government. For instance, over our 35-year sample period (1977-2011) , over 7% of publicly traded firms rely on the government for over 10% of their sales in each given year. Their average dependence is large, with linked-firms relying on the government for over 23% of their mean total sales. This masks the fact that a number of firms are in fact much more dependent -for instance Delta Tucker Holdings, Inc. received 96% of their sales revenue from the government, while
McDonnell Douglas Corp., Raytheon Co., and PacifiCare Health Systems all received over 50% of their sales from the government.
Using this data we are then able to explore how the incentives, and resultant behavior and investment patterns, might differ in these governmentdependent firms. First, we find that government dependents spend considerably less on investment in upgrading physical and intellectual capital than otherwise identical firms in the same industry. For instance, their investment in new capital is 5% (t=3.84) lower, and investment in intellectual capital through R&D is 6% (t=2.03) lower, than peer firms in the same industry. These firms also grow significantly slower than other firms in their industries -with sales growth around 13% (t=6.26) lower than industry peers.
The differences we document are not simply a function of firms more generally that rely on a single major customer for a large percentage (over 10%) of their sales. We collect data on all firms that report relying on a major privatesector customer and test the same behaviors. These firms that compete for, and win, large private-sector clients (clients such as: Walmart, Apple, Microsoft, etc.) in fact appear more competitive than their industry counterparts. These privatesector suppliers have significantly higher sales growth (15% higher (t=8.45)), and invest significantly more in physical and intellectual capital.
The difficulty with identifying the impacts of being a government customer on firm actions and outcomes is that the decision to become a government customer is a two-sided matching problem. This means, of course, that both the government has to choose the firm as a supplier and the firm in question has to choose the government as a customer -this induces a selection problem of observed firms into the role (and continued service) as government dependents. In other words, it might be that certain firms select into their role as government dependents, and all of the empirical facts we document are simply a function of those firms' types, and not of the fact that they are government dependents. We address this selection concern in two ways. First, we handcollect data on bid protests made by firms that attempt to become (select into) government dependents, but barely lose out to a winning firm. These firms are able to publicly protest the outcome, and we are then able to observe the winner and loser of the government's sales contract. This identification now controls for selection of firm type as both firms vying for the government's sales signal their type as one of those attempting to be government dependents. We find that while the "winners" of the contract perform largely in line with the results we find for all government dependents (i.e., lower capex, R&D, and lower sales growth), the "losing" firms perform significantly better. Now that the losing firms are subject to market competition, they have significantly higher investments in physical and intellectual capital, along with higher sales growth, going forward following their losing bid.
The second method we use to identify exogenous changes to government sales exposures is through the exogenous changes in powerful committee chairman in the US Senate. While this does not address the selection of firms to become government dependents, it does represent an exogenous shock to the intensive margin of revenue streaming in from the government to the firm. The committee chairmanship selection process is done nearly entirely through a seniority structure within controlling party, often occurring in years where the ascending chairman is not even up for election (i.e., the death, retirement, or voting out of the standing chair given staggered voting). Thus, the shock to the ascending chair's state is plausibly exogenous with respect to economic conditions in that state. Given that the literature has shown that this type of shock to power is associated with large shocks to government spending arriving at the ascending chairman's state, we use this exogenous flow of government funds to a given state to test the impact of exogenous shocks to government spending on government dependents' sales revenue. We find a massive impact -in the period following the chairmanship shock to their state government dependents see over a 30% increase in sales revenue from the government, which is highly statistically significant in all specifications (p<0.01).
Coupling this with the test above on contested government contract bids, we see evidence that both on the extensive (firm-selection) margin and intensive margin, government dependents appear to be significantly reliant on the government for sales revenue, and tend to behave differently relative to other firms because of this reliance.
In sum, we show evidence that government dependents appear to invest less in both new physical and new intellectual capital and to grow more slowly than peer firms. We provide causal evidence that it is the link to the government that is causing these firms to exhibit these different behaviors.
While government contracts may appear to provide benefits to firms in terms of offering a large credit-worthy counterparty, the subtle impacts that this relationship can have on incentives to compete and innovate may more than offset its advantages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief background and literature review. Section II describes the data construction and summary statistics of the sample we use in this paper. Section III presents the main empirical results on government customer firms, and Section IV concludes.
I. Background and Literature Review
Our paper adds to a growing literature exploring the costs and benefits (2010)), not to mention the increased ability to capture lucrative procurement contracts (Goldman et. al (2008) ). 1 We add to this literature by exploring the more subtle side of strong government links to corporations, for example the incentive effects on firm behavior, and the extent to which government links affect subsequent growth, investment, and innovation by connected firms. Our paper is unique in that we examine a new channel between firms and the government that has to date been unexplored: the presence of the government as a substantial customer for a firm.
While our focus in this paper is on the micro-level impacts of government links on the behavior of individual publicly traded corporations, our paper is also related to the vast empirical literature analyzing the impact of government actions on the broader economy as a whole. For example, a large literature investigates the impact of government spending on consumption, investment, and output variables. The standard approach in this literature is to apply a VAR methodology to macroeconomic data in order to identify shocks to government spending.
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Most of these studies focus on quarterly post-war data in the U.S., which places a heavy burden on the econometrics to uncover the relationship from a limited time series of highly persistent variables. Although some studies consider international panel data, variation in economic size and openness, labor market rigidities, and other considerations limit the amount of additional power these data add.
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The literature has also pursued some alternative strategies to isolate changes in government spending that are exogenous. For instance, several studies focus on periods of significant expansion in US defense spending (the socalled "Ramey-Shapiro episodes") to examine the impact of spending shocks. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . 4 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) , Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) , and Cavallo (2005)).
examine exogenous spending shocks. Unfortunately, the occurrence of large and unambiguous shocks to government defense spending is somewhat rare, which restricts the power of these tests.
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Our paper is more closely related to a stream of recent papers that examine the state level impacts of government spending on consumption, output, and firm behavior. Many of these papers examine the effects of government spending during specific periods of economic stress and factor underutilization, when the multiplier should be at its largest according to the Keynesian model. their impact on the behavior of US public corporations. The advantage of our approach in this paper is that we can finely pinpoint the impact of government links on individual firms, as opposed to employing a coarse state-level shock; this enables us to identify the causal impact of government sales on individual firm behavior.
Lastly, our paper relates to another strand of the literature that examines how political representation translates to government expenditures, which are then allocated to local stakeholders. These studies include Atlas et al. (1995) ,
Hoover and Pecorino (2005), Crain and Tollison (1977, 1981) , Goss (1972) , Greene and Munley (1980) , Kiel and McKenzie (1983) , Ray (1980 Ray ( , 1981 , Ritt Taken as a whole, the literature finds only modest linkages between the nature of 6 Other papers that have used instruments for state-level government spending include Knight (2002 and 2005) who uses transportation committee membership, and Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) , who use the tenure of appropriations committee members.
congressional representation and the distribution of congressional spending. We add to this evidence by uncovering a new link between committee representation (especially on the Armed Forces Committee) and firm sales to the government.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
A. Data Construction
The data in this study are collected and coded from several sources. For the majority of sources, we hand-collect, -code, and -match the data to combine the sources for our analysis. First, we identify firms listing the government as a major customer. Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report selected information about operating segments in interim financial reports issued to shareholders. In particular, firms are required to disclose certain financial information for any industry segment that comprised more than 10% of consolidated yearly sales, assets or profits, and the identity of any customer representing more than 10% of the total reported sales. 7 Our sample of government-linked firms consist of all firms listed in the CRSP/Compustat database with non missing values of book equity (BE) and market equity (ME)
at the fiscal-year end, for which we can identify a major customer as the government.
We extract the identity of the firm's principal customers from the We are deliberately conservative in assigning customer names and firm identifiers to make sure that customer are matched to the appropriate stock returns and financial information.
Customers for which we could not identify a unique match are excluded from the sample.
To construct our sample of government contract bid protests, we performed an exhaustive manual search of the WestLaw database. This database contains the case filings of official protests regarding government contracts that were awarded to other firms. For each case, we have the company names involved in the protest, the case number, the type of contract under protest, the date of the protest, and other information about the details of the contract. Top1ChairOnly means the Senator was appointed chairman of the top-ranked Senate Finance Committee. We also construct an alternative shock definition that includes both the chairman and the ranking minority member (i.e., the most senior committee member who is a member of the party not currently in control of that House of congress), so that Shock Top1Chair&Rank is equal to 1 if a Senator becomes either chairman or the ranking minority member of the committee, when he/she was previously not in either position in the prior Congress. We code the seniority shocks as starting in the year of appointment, and apply them for 6 years (term of a senator).
B. Summary Statistics Table I This panel also indicates that government-linked firms are a bit larger, similar in book-to-market ratio, and are (unconditionally) associated with lower sales growth, capex, and R&D. In later tests, we verify these patterns more formally in a regression context controlling for other variables, and in tests designed to isolate the causal impact of government sales on firm outcomes. firms located in the South and West also feature prominently in this list.
III. Empirical Results

A. The Impact of Shocks to Government Sales
Our first preliminary set of tests explores the impact of shocks to local political power on firm-level government sales. The goal of this test is simply to establish a link between exogenous government spending and government "dependency" (i.e., sales to the government), for the set of firms that are reliant on the government. Here the set of firms choosing to be government dependents is taken as given (we explore the causal impact of government sales on firm outcomes later in the paper), and we simply study how firms' sales to the government are affected by local shocks to political power. We employ statelevel Senate "seniority shocks" as described earlier, and test the impact of the random ascension to power of a firm's U.S. Senator to a powerful congressional committee position (either chairman or ranking minority member). Table IV shows that these shocks to power lead to significant increases in the amount of sales to the government, for the set of firms already reporting the government as a major customer. 12 The magnitude of this effect is large (ranging from a 23% to 35% increase in government sales). Further, the last two rows of Table IV show that orthogonalizing the Top 5 shock (i.e., removing the impact of Top 1 or Top 3 shocks) yields a very large effect, on the order of an 84% increase in government sales after the shock. Interestingly, it turns out that this finding is driven by shocks to the Armed Forces Committee (which is a Top 5
committee, but not a Top 3 committee); specifically, having one's local Senator ascend to the chair of the Armed Forces Committee has a very large impact on sales to the government.
B. The Performance of Firms Reporting the Government as a Major Customer
What are the effects of relying on the government for such a huge share of revenues?
In this section we begin to explore the firm-level impact of government dependency. Our goal is to shed light on the incentive effects on firm behavior, and more directly the extent to which government links affect growth, investment, and innovation by connected firms.
We begin by analyzing the impact of having a major government customer on firm-level outcomes. We first run simple panel regressions of a variety of firm-level outcomes, such as sales growth, capital expenditures (scaled by lagged assets), and R&D (again scaled by lagged assets) on an indicator variable for whether or not a firm is a "government customer firm." We run OLS regressions at the firm-year level, and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Table V shows that government-linked firms experience significantly lower sales growth, and invest significantly less both in terms of capital expenditures and in terms of R&D. The magnitudes of these effects are substantial, even after including year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. For example, Column 2 of Table V indicates that having a major government customer is associated with 2.8% lower annual sales growth; relative to the sample mean of 21.3%, this implies a 13% relative decrease in sales growth.
C. The Causal Impact of Government Sales on Firms
Next we confront the endogeneity issue present when analyzing firms reporting the government as a major customer. The issue is of course that there may be selection in the set of firms who decide to sell to the government, and this selection may be correlated with the outcome variables we consider. To get around this problem, we need a set of seemingly-identical firms who also "want"
to obtain the government as a major customer, but are unable to do so.
It turns out that data does exist for precisely this set of firms, in the form of bid protest filings. These bid protests are formal protests undertaken by firms who also tried to "win" a government contract, but were not selected; the protests are formal grievances filed on behalf of these losing bidder companies.
Thus the experiment we have in mind is to examine the impact of winning a major government customer on both the "winners" and the "close losers," in the years immediately following the awarding of the government contract. This identification strategy is similar in spirit to the approach used in Greenstone, In Table VI , we examine the performance of these losing bidder firms in the years following their unsuccessful bid. Specifically, we create a firm-level indicator for "losing bidder" and also include a "post-losing bid" variable in the regression that is set equal to 1 in the three years immediately following the losing bid for these losing bidders, and is set to zero at all other times. 13 We then include these variables along with the control variables included in Table V . Table VI indicates that the effects captured by the "losing bidder" variable mirror the effects shown for the "government customer" variable described earlier. For example, these losing bidder firms on average experience significantly lower sales growth, and invest significantly less in capital expenditures and R&D; thus these firms appear very similar to the governmentlinked firms that win the contracts. What happens in the wake of losing these government contracts is quite revealing, however. In the three years following a losing bid that they subsequently protest, these losing firms experience significantly higher sales growth, and invest significantly more in capital expenditures and R&D. These effects are again large in magnitude. For example, the losing bidders invest 1.7% more in R&D in the years following a losing bid; relative to a sample mean of 11%, this implies a 15% relative increase in R&D spending following a lost bid. For capital expenditures, losing bidders invest 1.2% more in the years following their losing bids, which in turn equates to a 14% relative increase in capex spending.
In summary, we find that government dependents experience significantly lower sales growth, and engage in significantly less investment. When we then use bid protests by losing bidders on government contracts as a vehicle to isolate the causal effect of government sales on firm-level outcomes, we find that losing bidders experience the reverse effects immediately following their losing bid: they have significantly higher sales growth, and they invest a statistically and economically higher amount on capex and R&D.
D. The Impact of Private versus Public (Government) Customers
Our last set of tests analyzes the differential impact of having a major government customer versus having a major private-sector customer. As described above, we exploit the same statutory requirement that forces firms to list their major customers, but here we make use of the fact that firms must also report their major private-sector customers in addition to their major government dependents. Including a "private sector customer" dummy into the same regressions from Table V enables us to examine the relative effects of these two types of customers. Table VII presents the results of these tests. Specifically, it shows that while government-linked firms experience significantly lower sales growth and invest less, firms with major private-sector firms experience the reverse pattern:
they have significantly higher sales growth, and tend to invest more.
Collectively, these findings coupled with the results in Tables V and VI suggest that supplying to the government may have important incentive externalities for the way these firms operate, since they tend to experience markedly different outcomes and behave in a very dissimilar way to firms that are not tied to the government.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we show that government customer relationships can lead to large distortions in firm behavior and firm outcomes. We provide evidence consistent with the idea that firms that rely on the government for a large share of their business income become less competitive relative to identical industry peers. These government dependents invest significantly less in new physical and intellectual capital, and grow significantly slower than other firms in the industry. This pattern is not merely a function of being the type of firm that enters into a substantive customer-supplier relationship; for example, firms in identical industries that enter into large customer agreements with private-sector firms contrastingly invest more in physical and intellectual capital than industry peers. These firms, exposed to the discipline of a private-market large customer (i.e., Walmart, Apple, General Electric, etc.), also appear to grow significantly more quickly than industry peer firms.
To address the selection concern of government customer firms selecting to link to the government, and thus our results being driven by firm selection (and not the impact of being a government customer), we run two tests. The first is on the extensive margin by examining firms that identically select to be government dependents, but barely miss out, and then protest the contract allocation to the winning firm. While the government-sales "winning" firm performs in line with the full sample of government dependents (i.e., with lower capex, R&D, and growth), the "losing" firm, which subsequently goes on to compete in the private market, has significantly higher investment in capital and higher sales growth following their losing bid. The second method is on the intensive margin. We show that exogenous shocks to the government funding in a state result in large shocks to the government sales revenue for existing government dependents. Coupling these two results provides evidence that both on the extensive (firm-selection) margin and on the intensive margin, government dependents appear to be reliant on the government for sales revenue, and tend to behave differently from other firms because of this reliance.
Taken as a whole, we provide new evidence that government customer relationships have subtle, yet economically large, impacts on firm behaviors and outcomes. Specifically, government dependents appear to invest less in physical and intellectual capital along with growing more slowly, with these behaviors being caused by the government customer relationship. While firms continue to vie for seemingly lucrative government contract relationships, the message of this paper is that a full accounting of the incentive effects and their impact on longrun competitive and innovative behavior needs to be examined in order to determine the true long-run NPV of the government as an important economywide customer. 
